system. 6 In New York State, each party'sjudicial convention determines candidates for the state supreme court judicial elections. Consequently, many of those nominated by the conventions will have political obligations to the party leaders instrumental in getting them the party designation. On the other hand, senators in some states designate the federal district court nominees using a meritbased judicial selection process. Many conversant with both the federal and state judiciary would say that the appointment system used in the federal selection system leads to fewer political obligations and, overall, attracts more distinguished jurists.
II. MERIT-BASED JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK
When I became Mayor of the City of New York in 1978, I, like every mayor before me, had absolute power to appoint anyone I decided worthy to the criminal and family courts. 7 The only limitations were constitutional requirements that the appointee must have been a lawyer for at least ten years and a resident of the City of New York. ' Mayor Wagner, 9 followed by Mayors Lindsay 1° and Beame, created a screening, non-meritjudicial selection system. While still not a merit-based selection system, it was better than that of their predecessors because qualifying committees were asked to appraise the proposed candidates' professional qualifications. Nevertheless, it also happens that each of the three mayors, on at least one occasion during their time in office, rejected the negative rating given to a particular candidate by the qualifying committee and appointed him or her anyway. 12 As mayor-elect, I denounced this ac- 12 For example, in Mayor Beame's case, after losing the primary in 1977 and before leaving office, he appointed ten people to fill judicial vacancies. The two committees authorized to review the candidates' qualifications were the Mayor's Committee on theJudiciary (to which he appointed all the members) and a committee of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The latter found the ten selections tion and announced my intention to not reappoint these candidates when their terms ended. That self-imposed prohibition ended with my creation of a merit-based judicial selection system for the City of New York.
After I was inaugurated, I asked members of my administration to propose a totally merit-based selection system for the appointment of judges. I adopted and created by Executive Order the system that they proposed. 1 3 In this system, the mayor appointed the Chair of the Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary ("Mayor's Committee") and twelve of its members. 14 The two presiding justices of the First and Second Departments of the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court each appointed another six members, and the deans of various law schools in the city appointed the other two members on a rotating basis.'" Thus, the Mayor's Committee had twenty-seven members 1 6 and fewer than half were appointed by the mayor.
I also made a commitment concerning all reappointments. If both committees, the Mayor's Committee and The Association of the Bar of the City of New York ("City Bar Association"), 7 recommended that any sitting judge be reappointed at the end of his or her term, I would reappoint that person without exception. Similarly, if either of those two committees recommended that a sitting judge not be reappointed, I would, without exception, follow its advice.
The most important aspect of the new merit-based judicial selection system was that I, as Mayor, voluntarily waived my rights to submit names for consideration to the Mayor's Committee. I requested that the Mayor's Committee submit three names to me for each vacancy.' 8 I retained overall responsibility and accountability by personally interviewing the three candidates, from which I selected one. If I found none of the three submissions to be satisfactory, I would ask the Mayor's Committee for three more names. This did not apply to sitting judges where both committees recommended reappointment. If either committee recommended deunqualified to sit as criminal or family court judges, but Mayor Beame appointed them anyway. 
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nial of the reappointment, the vacancy would be filled in the above way. 19 I also directed that anyone who wanted to be ajudge could apply directly to the Mayor's Committee and ask for a hearing on his or her request for appointment. 2° In addition, the Mayor's Committee was authorized to seek candidates. 2 6 When that happened, despite my original intention not to reappoint them, I abided by the decisions of the two committees to reappoint without exception. Those committees recommended that about one-half of the original ten be reappointed and that the others not be reappointed. I adhered to their decisions.
Indeed, there were other occasions when both committees recommended that individuals not be reappointed. Often judges were highly regarded by other members of the judiciary, who asked me to override the committees' recommendations. I never did. If the mayor had knowledge concerning a candidate or someone seeking reappointment, it would have been perfectly proper for him or her to bring the information to the attention of his or her Early in Mayor Giuliani's administration, I received a call from his counsel, Dennison Young, who told me that the Mayor was considering reducing the Mayor's Committee from the existing twentyseven members to nineteen. He wanted to know my opinion. I told him that I thought it was a bad idea; the system was not broken and there was no need to fix it. He raised no other change with me.
Subsequently, Mayor Giuliani announced that he was not reappointing Judges Eugene Schwartzwald andJerome Kay, two of the original ten criminal court judges appointed by Mayor Beame, and whom I reappointed, and who had been recommended for reappointment by the two committees for the second time. I immediately criticized Mayor Giuliani for rejecting the recommendations of the committees.
29
Mayor Giuliani denounced those of us who criticized his actions, including Judith Kaye, Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals." 0 Judge Kaye met with Mayor Giuliani when the Mayor announced he was rejecting the committees' recommendations, and asked him to reappoint both judges to full ten-year terms. When she publicly criticized Mayor Giuliani's decision, he, in turn, "criticized her for criticizing him, saying she had overstepped her bounds." 'scandalous' and 'calamitous,' and said he could never endorse a candidate for mayor who had injected politics into the courtroom."). In support of his decision, Mayor Giuliani announced that his standards were higher than those of the committees. 3 He further stated he would exercise those standards in overruling the committees in these two cases and where appropriate in the future because he wanted judges of the very highest quality. 34 At a press conference, Mayor Giuliani attacked former Mayor Dinkins and me and accused both of our administrations of making political appointments to the bench. 5 The New York Times columnist Joyce Purnick later pointed out that Mayor Giuliani failed to note "that the reference was to a different der that altered the process for reappointing incumbent judges and gave himself somewhat greater latitude than his two predecessors. The provision in the July 20, 1994, order gave the Mayor authority to ask his Advisory Committee on the Judiciary to provide him with the names of three qualified candidates to succeed an incumbent judge in the event he decided not to reappoint a sitting judge, even if the committee had recommended reappointment of the sitting judge. According to City Hall officials, no additional names were requested to replace the two demoted judges, Eugene Schwartzwald and Jerome M. Kay. The Mayor's counsel, Dennison Young, Jr., said the new language was added "to try to enhance the quality of the judiciary." But Mr. Young vigorously disputed that the change obligated the Mayor to request three new names and asserted that the Mayor already had an adequate number of candidates before him when he made his choice.
Id.
33 Don Van Natta, Jr., Giuliani's Choice Suffice it to say that the two persons appointed by Mayor Giuliani do not appear to bear out his stated reason for the appointments, that they were far superior to those whom they were replacing. It now seems, according to The New York Times, that the Mayor's first replacement, Charles A. Posner, had "very little courtroom experience, having tried just seven cases in his six years as a top aide" to Brooklyn District Attorney Joe Hynes. 4 When The New York Times' editorial was followed by an equally scathing editorial in Crain's New York Business, 5 I thought there was indeed hope that Mayor Giuliani would be held responsible for destroying the merit-based judicial selection system, by replacing it with a political system that allows him to determine with absolute unchecked authority who should be reappointed. Crain's New York Business stated, "Mr. Giuliani's virulent reaction [to his critics] is part of a pattern of disparagement that he heaps upon his critics and opponents. Adversaries must not merely be overcome, they must be pulverized." 5 6 In 1995, Mayor Giuliani denied Judge Eugene Schwartzwald reappointment to the criminal court and instead appointed him to a one year interim civil court judgeship. 5 7 At the swearing-in ceremony, Judge Schwartzwald refused to shake the Mayor's hand. 5 8 In December 1996, the Mayor's Committee apparently found Judge Schwartzwald's refusal to shake the Mayor's hand indicative of a lack of judicial temperament. News reports conveyed that the Mayor's Committee recommended against Mayor Giuliani providing Judge Schwartzwald with another interim civil court appointment because of that incident. 5 9 I concurred with the Mayor's Committee's decision, publicly saying thatJudge Schwartzwald's refusal to shake the Mayor's hand "showed a lack ofjudicial temperament." 60 I drew a distinction between Mayor Giuliani making the decision not to reappoint Judge Schwartzwald, for his own political reasons, and the Mayor accepting the decision of the Mayor's Committee.
Under approved by both judiciary committees should not have to worry whether a particular mayor will find them appropriate for reappointment.
62
Additionally, Ms. Robinson responded to written questions I had concerning the Mayor's changes in the judicial selection process and the City Bar Association's role in that process. The following are excerpts from her reply:
First, I can confirm that the [City Bar Association] was not consulted about any changes made to the relevant executive order. While we did respond to certain changes in the language regarding diversity, we did not comment on any other changes....
As you know, our Judiciary Committee evaluates all candidates forjudicial office in our city .... As I told you, our Judiciary Committee applies the same standards to all candidates it reviews and I provided you a copy of the relevant language.... The Mayor had not asked our Committee on the Judiciary to review or upgrade its standards. However, the Mayor's recent decision not to re-appoint two incumbent judges who had been approved by both his and our Judiciary Committees and the ensuing controversy presented us with an opportunity to meet with the Mayor and his advisors to discuss our concerns. We suggested that we work cooperatively together to review the standards being applied by both Committees to be sure that only those candidates found "well-qualified" were approved, the standard required by the State Constitution. We agree with you that the re-appointment of incumbent judges raises special concerns about judicial independence ....
Whenever an appointing authority appoints someone who has been disapproved by [ ]our Judiciary Committee, we do speak out publicly and expect to continue to do so. We also publicize our approvals and disapprovals of all candidates we review who participate in judicial [ ]elections. Finally, you asked whether we would support a change in the law to require the Mayor to submit all nominees to the City Council for it to [ ]"advise and consent[."] We have never considered such a proposal so we have no position at the present time. Naturally, we would expect to review the specifics of any such proposal before we could do so. Thanks to the process you established, candidates for mayoral appointment who have been disapproved by ourJudiciary Committee have not been appointed to the bench.
Thank you again for everything you have done and continue to do to protect the integrity and independence of the [ ]judiciary. 6 " In my opinion, if Mayor Giuliani wants to raise judicial standards, all he has to do is direct the committees to raise theirs. By substituting his judgment for theirs, as Gary Brown, Executive Director of The Fund for Modem Courts, Inc. said, "[it] may very well have a chilling effect on judges .... I It is interesting, and disappointing, that so many lawyers have chosen to remain silent, undoubtedly fearful of Mayor Giuliani's vindictiveness. One well-known lawyer recently told me that he was glad I stood up to the Mayor and spoke out. I replied, "[i]t would be even better if you did." Another equally prominent lawyer told me that he would have spoken out, but due to his position with an organization receiving funds from the city, he did not because he was afraid the Mayor would cut off the funding.
Most lawyers are familiar with the 1866 saying of a New York State Surrogate, to wit, "[n]o man's life, liberty, or property are safe while the legislature is in session." 6 5 I think this sentiment is probably still true. I believe that it could also apply to the same extent to mayors and chief executives alike. It is also still true that The Legal Aid Society's Homeless Family Rights Project (the "Project") won its case at trial by establishing that the city had violated both law and court orders in processing homeless families seeking housing. The Project was required to go to the appellate division after the city filed a notice of appeal. If this case simply involved an appeal by the city, as is its right, no one could fault the Giuliani Administration. However, the Mayor went far beyond the filing of the notice of appeal, and undertook to personally attack Judge Helen Freedman with his demeaning language, a deplorable and dangerous action. During the Dinkins and Giuliani Administrations, Judge Freedman imposed fines totalling $5 million against the city for disobeying her orders in this ongoing matter. 6 8 The City of New York faces another $1 million in penalties, currently stayed on appeal. 6 In this particular instance, Mayor Giuliani is facing a New York State Supreme Court justice who, because she is elected, does not have to rely upon a chief executive's generosity of spirit to be reappointed at the end of her term, and cannot be terrorized. However, there are many who do rely upon this generosity, particularly criminal and family court judges, who are often appointed to preside as acting supreme courtjustices. Surely, some judges would be fearful of Mayor Giuliani and his implied and expressed threats that they will not be reappointed unless they meet his standards regardless of the evaluations given by the Mayor's Committee and the City Bar Association. What would such a message convey to Judge Freedman if she were an appointed judge, that is, a criminal or family court judge presiding as an "acting" New York State Supreme Court judge?
On February 11, 1997, the appellate division affirmed Judge Freedman's ruling holding the Mayor and the city in contempt. Imagine what the consequences would be for Judge Freedman if she needed Mayor Giuliani's consent for her reappointment.
The Mayor's vicious personal attacks on the judiciary go far beyond responsible criticism, which is always legitimate. He is seeking to place judges in a state of fear, making a government of men, not of laws. This brings to mind a quote from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar: "Upon what meat doth this our Caesar feed, that he is grown so great?" 7 4 The City of New York is the number one litigant in the civil and criminal courts of this city. Do we want our judges to succumb to the extralegal pressures of the Mayor?
IV. THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES BAER, FRIEDMAN, AND CHIN?
In several cases, Governor Pataki 7 " and President Clinton 7 6 72 Pearl & Seifman, supra note 67, at 5. Police did not observe any conversation between any of the four men. 8 3 Bayless drove away and the police followed. 84 At a stoplight, two of the four males, who were standing nearby, recognized the police officers.
8 5 At that time, all four males "moved in different directions at a rapid gait."" After the stoplight turned green, the officers continued to follow Bayless. 7 The officer testified that in order to prevent Bayless from entering a major highway and before they could "run a [computer] 
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males, particularly the way they crossed the street in single file and did not speak with the driver of the car; the fact that the males ran once they noticed the officers; and the duffel bags the males placed in the trunk of the car.
90
After police stopped Bayless, they looked in the trunk of her car, 9 1 wherein they found thirty-four kilograms of cocaine and two kilograms of heroin. 9 2 Bayless was arrested at the scene. 93 After hoods can count on little security for their person. For most of the country, Judge Baer's decision flew in the face of common sense. In order to sustain a police officer's investigative stop and search of Bayless' car trunk, Judge Baer had to find that the officers had a "'reasonable suspicion' supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot.' "106 Judge Baer's decision is laden with evidence that demonstrates an appalling antilaw enforcement bias. For example, he tortured the facts and circumstances in order to conclude that the police lacked the requisite "reasonable suspicion" to support their stop; his out-of-hand rejection of the police officer's testimony based upon the statement of a defendant never subjected to cross-examination; and his statement that the men were correct to run when they saw the police. In a final stroke, Judge Baer branded the U.S. Attorney's efforts to have him reconsider the suppression motion "a juvenile project. known as Megan's Law, which mandates that the addresses of released sex offenders be made public,' cannot be applied retroac-
